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I. Introduct i on
I n t hi s paper  we   i nvest i gat e t he eff ects of  l abour  dem and const r aint s on  an i ndi vi dual ’ s propensi t y  t o 
experi ence povert y.  Al t hough povert y i s m ost oft en associated w it h unem pl oyed or ot herwi se 
di saff ected i ndi vi dual s,  i t   can also i m pact  upon t hose i n wo r k i f   t hey are pai d especiall y l ow  wa g e s   -
a poss i bi l i t y t o wh i ch  t he  r ecent  mi ni mu m  pay  l egislati on  stands  t estam ent.   Ther e i s anot her  aspect  of 
povert y,   how ever,   t hat   has r eceived r elati vel y scant  att enti on am ongst   econom i sts.  Labour  dem and 
const r aint s can ma n i f est  t hem sel ves i n t erms   of  bot h pri ces and quant i t i es,  and  even r elati vel y  we l l -
pai d  wo r kers can sli p  i nt o  povert y  i f   t here i s a ceil i ng  on  t he  num ber  of  hours t hey  are able t o  wo r k.
Al t hough i n pri nci pl e t he arr ay of  em ploym ent   cont r acts on off er  t o a part i cular  wo r ker  of 
gi ven s ki l l s   could be very l arge,   i n practi ce t hey  t end  t o  be  qui t e sm all   - norma l l y a f ul l -ti me   cont r act 
of  35-40 hours per  w eek or  a part -ti me   cont r act  of  15-20  hours per  w eek.  The  quest i on  as t o  w hy 
t hi s is the case invol ves i ssues regardi ng t he nat ure of the fi r m’ s product i on process: Ma n y  j obs 
r equi r e very precisely defi ned hours const r aint s on account  of the co-ordi nat i on bet w een f actor 
i nput s.  Such cont r acts t ypi call y specif y very clearl y wh e r e and wh e n   wo r kers are expected t o be 
present.   For   exam ple,  a cont r act  f or  product i on l i ne wo r kers   wi l l   be heavil y i nfl uenced by t he f act 
t hat  the l i ne has an opt i mu m s t aff i ng l evel.  St art  and fi ni s h t i me s  wi l l ,  therefore, be careful l y co-
ordi nat ed wi t h t he operati ng t i me s   of  t he l i ne.   I ndeed t hey are oft en staggered i n order  t hat   t he f l ow  
of  product i on  t hrough  t he  l i ne  mi ght   be  ma t ched by  t he  s t aff i ng  l evel.
I ndeed,  f or  a bat t ery of  i nst i t ut i onal   and /   or  t echni cal  r easons m any j obs are characteri sed 
by  a f i xed  l engt h  wo r ki ng  w eek and  t here i s l i t t l e scope  f or  em ployees t o  adjust   t hei r   suppl y  of  wo r k
except by changi ng j ob.  But  changing j ob i s costl y and t here are relati vel y few  job opport uni t i es 
avail able i n l arge sectors of  t he spectr um  of  w eekly hours.  Consequent l y m any i ndi vi dual s are l i kel y 
t o be observed out   of  equil i bri um  wi t h r espect  t o t hei r  labour  s uppl y at  any gi ven t i me   [ I l m akunnas 
and  Pudney  ( 1990)] .  
Ther e are a num ber of labour ma r ket  m odel s, as w ell  as m ount i ng em pi r i cal evidence,  
suggest i ng t hat   em ploym ent   cont r acts specif y bot h hours and pay [ St ew art   and Swaf f i eld ( 1997),  4 4
Di ckens and Lundberg (1993),  Al t onj i  and Paxson (1992),  K ahn and Lang (1991)] .  Al t onj i  and 
Paxson  ( 1992)  f i nd  evidence  wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h  t he  hypot hesi s t hat   const r aint s on  t he  choi ce of 
hours   wi t hi n i ndi vi dual   f i r ms   l i mi t   t he extent  t o wh i ch wo r kers   experi encing  a change i n  t hei r   ma r gi nal  
r ate of subst i t ut i on bet w een incom e and l eisure are able to change hours of wo r k w i t hi n a j ob.  
Si mi l arl y,   K ahn and Lang ( 1991)  obt ain r esult s t hat   suggest   t hat   usi ng actual   hours of  wo r k causes 
bi as i n l abour  suppl y esti ma t es. Fur t her  evidence support i ng t he existence of  hours const r aint s and 
t he  r esult i ng  bi as i n  esti ma t es i s docum ent ed by  Di ckens and  Lundberg  ( 1993).
I n wh a t   f ol l ow s we   exam ine t he extent  t o wh i ch such const r aint s i m pact  upon povert y.   Ou r  
analysi s suggest s that  there has been a signi f i cant increase in w orki ng povert y i n Bri t ain over the 
peri od 1985-1996,  the m aj ori t y of wh i ch can be att r i but ed to underpaym ent .  U nderem ploym ent ,  
how ever,   i s seen t o r epresent  a signi f i cant,   and i ncreasing,   const r aint   on t he abil i t y of  em ployees t o 
escape povert y.
The paper is set out  as fol l ow s:  Secti on II  out l i nes our dat a w hil st Secti on II I  di scusses 
som e t ermi nol ogy and esti ma t es t he proport i on of  t he l ow  pai d and underem ployed wo r kers w ho 
we  d e f i ne as poor.  In Secti on IV we  e s t i ma t e labour suppl y funct i ons and st ochast i c fr ont i er 
earni ngs equat i ons t o m easure the ext ent of underem ploym ent  and underpaym ent  f or a
r epresentati ve sam pl e of ma l e em ployees. In Secti on IV,  we  e s t i ma t e the pot enti al change in t he 
povert y gap fol l ow i ng t he eli mi nat i on of  underpaym ent   and underem ploym ent .   Fi nal   c o mme n t s are 
coll ected i n  Secti on  V.
II. D ata
Ou r   dat a are deri ved  f r om   t he  Br i t i sh Soci al  At t i t udes  ( BSA)   Sur veys.   These are an annual   seri es of 
surveys i ni t i ated i n 1983 by Soci al  and Com m uni t y Pl anni ng  R esearch and  f unded  by  t he  M onum ent  
Tr ust .   A ddi t i onal   cont r i but i ons are also ma d e   by t he Count r ysi de Co mmi ssion,   t he De p a r t me n t   of 
t he Envi r onm ent ,   t he Econom i c and Soci al  R esearch Counci l   ( ESRC) ,   Ma r ks and Spencer  Pl c,  t he 
Nu f f i eld Foundat i on and Shel l  UK Lt d.  The dat a are deri ved fr om  a cross-secti onal   sam ple of 5 5
i ndi vi dual s,  aged 18 and over,   l i vi ng i n pri vat e househol ds w hose addresses we r e on t he electoral 
r egistr ar. 1
The  BSA  surveys  f or  t he  years 1985,   1987,   1990,   1993,   1994  and  1996  ask em ployees  i f :  
( a)  t hey w oul d l i ke t o wo r k f ew er  hours t han t hey are curr entl y wo r ki ng;   ( b)  i f   t hey w oul d l i ke t o 
wo r k m ore hours than t hey are curr entl y w orki ng;  and (c) if  they are sati sfi ed w it h t hei r  curr ent 
hours of  wo r k  and,   hence  w oul d  not   l i ke  t o  change t hese  cont r actual   hours.  We   f ocus  exclusi vel y  on 
ma l e em ployees,  t hereby abstr acti ng f r om  part i cipat i on i ssues t hat   so occlude f em ale l abour  suppl y 
decisions,   and  classif y  t hose  w ho  r espond  posi t i vel y  t o  quest i on  ( b)  as underem ployed.
Gi ven t he t i me   f r am e of  our  dat a we   pool ed t he  t hree earl i est  ( 1985,   1987,   1990)  and  t hree 
l atest  surveys ( 1993,   1994,   1996)  t o bet t er  hi ghl i ght   how  l ow  pay,   underem ploym ent   and povert y 
has  evol ved  over  t he  past   t wo   decades.  Al l   i ncom e  and  wa g e   dat a are defl ated t o  1996  val ues.
III. W hat  do  We   Me a n   by  ‘ Poverty’?
Ou r   f i r st  t ask i s t o defi ne t he i ssue i n hand.   Thi s i s di f f i cult   because t here i s no uni versall y accepted 
defi ni t i on of  povert y. 2  At   i t s mo s t   abstr act,   povert y coul d be used t o descri be a sit uat i on i n wh i ch a 
part i cular social uni t  i s defi cient i n a part i cular m easure of econom i c w ealt h.  But  t here is no 
consensus as t o eit her  t he appropri ate social  uni t   ( e.g.   i ndi vi dual ,   nucl ear  f am il y,   househol d)  and /   or 
m easure of w ealt h (e.g.  labour incom e,  m oney i ncom e,  expendi t ure).  This opaqueness can have 
i m port ant r epercussions for qual i t ati ve st atem ents regardi ng t r ends i n povert y.  For  exam ple,
alt hough t he i ncom e of  t he poorest  decil e of  Br i t i sh ma l e em ployees f ell   by 18 per  cent  i n r eal  t erms  
over  t he  peri od  1979-1992,   t hei r   expendi t ure r ose  by  14  per  cent  [ G oodm an  and  W ebb  ( 1995)] . 3
O ne approach is to com pare a scalar m easure of a part i cular social uni t ’ s incom e w i t h a 
specif i ed povert y l i ne.  But  again t here is no agreem ent as to w here thi s li ne shoul d be set .  An  
‘ absolut e’ m easure could be const r uct ed accordi ng t o t he resources requi sit e to buy w hat  i s 
consi dered to be a ‘mi ni mu m’  basket  of goods and serves.  The i ncom e l evel const i t ut i ng t hi s 
1  For   an  extensive  di scussion  of  t he  BSA  surveys  see  Bl anchfl ow er  ( 1991).
2  See  At ki nson  ( 1987)  f or  r eview   of  povert y  concepts and  me t hods  of  m easurem ent.
3  A  r elated i ssue here concerns  t he  shari ng  of  r esources am ong  me mb e r s of  t he  uni t   of  analysi s.  I t   i s custom ary 
t o  assum e t hat   i ncom e  i s r edistr i but ed equal l y  wi t hi n  t he  f am il y  uni t .   Ho we v e r ,   an al t ernati ve  assum pti on  i s t hat  
r edistr i but i on  does  not   occur  and  t hat   any  shari ng  i s mi ni ma l .6 6
‘ mi ni mu m’ ,  how ever,  is debat able. Joseph and Sum pt i on (1979),  for exam ple, argue t hat  ‘…a
f am il y i s poor  i f   i t   cannot   aff ord t o eat. ’   I ndeed,  since f ood i s a f undam ent al  necessit y,   a t r adit i onal  
s t art i ng-poi nt   i n povert y analysi s has been t o calculate t he l evel  of  i ncom e r equi sit e t o purchase a 
‘ nut r i t i onal l y adequat e’ di et and t o adj ust  t hi s fi gure to al l ow  for expendi t ures on non-food
necessit i es.  Povert y i s t hen defi ned as t he i nabi l i t y of  i ncom e t o m eet  r equi r em ents.  Thi s so call ed 
budget  standerd approach has a l ong hi story i n t he UK,   havi ng been adopt ed i n t he pi oneeri ng 
studi es of  Rownt r ee ( 1901). 4
A  r elated approach i s t he food  rati o  me t hod  based  on  Engel ’ s ( 1895)  observat i on  t hat   t he 
share of  t ot al  i ncom e spent  on necessit i es t ends t o f all   wi t h i ncom e.   The  proport i on of  i ncom e spent 
on food (or necessit i es m ore generall y) ma y  t herefore be used as a povert y yardst i ck, wi t h a 
househol d  bei ng  r egarded  as poor  wh e r e necessit i es account   f or  a l arge  part   of  i t s t ot al  expendi t ure. 
Thi s m ethod di f f ers fr om  t he budget  standard approach in t hat  no at t em pt i s m ade to defi ne 
‘ nut r i t i onal   adequacy’  and i s used i n Canada as t he basi s f or  t he ‘ Low  I ncom e Cut -O ff s’  presented 
i n  off i cial  s t ati s t i cs.  
I f  povert y i s related to soci ety’s view s about  an acceptable standerd of li vi ng t hen one 
approach t o det ermi ni ng a povert y l i ne i s t o assess popul ar  vi ew s on  t hi s   i s s ue  on  t he  basi s   of  l arge-
scale surveys.   A  vari ety of  me t hods have been adopt ed,  i ncl udi ng asking r espondent s t o specif y t he 
i ncom es t hat   hypot het i cal  f am il i es w oul d need t o r each a cert ain standard of  l i vi ng.   The  answ ers t o 
t hese quest i ons are t hen used t o l i nk we l f are l evels   wi t h i ncom es.   Fi nal l y,   a ‘ cri t i cal’   we l f are l evel  i s  
selected and m apped ont o a corr espondi ng i ncom e l evel and t hat  incom e l evel is then used as a 
povert y l i ne.   An   exam ple of  such consensual  approaches i s Va n   Pr aag et  al .   ( 1982).   Ot hers r egard 
t hi s defi ni t i on as t oo str i ngent .   Lans l ey and M ack ( 1985),   f or  exam ple,  m easure povert y by asking 
r espondent s wh a t   t hey t hought   ‘ poor’   peopl e shoul d be able t o aff ord,   and defi ni ng as poor  t hose 
wi t h  i nsuff i cient  r esources t o  m eet  t hese  dem ands.
An  a l t ernat i ve i s to set  the l i ne accordi ng t o t he prevail i ng social  securit y system  and t o 
defi ne a uni t   as  poor  i f   i t s   i ncom e f all s   bel ow  t he mi ni mu m  benefi t   all ow ances  avail able [ Ab e l -Sm it h
4    A  cont em porary  and  som ew hat  broader  approach i s adopt ed by  Lans el y  and  M ack ( 1985)  w ho  f ocus  on  t he 
abil i t y of  i ndi vi dual s t o consum e ‘ sociall y defi ned necessit i es’.   These ma y   i ncl ude  t he  ow nership  of  consum er 
durables  or  even  t he  abil i t y  t o  part i cipat e  i n  a  hobby  or  l eisure  acti vi t y.7 7
and Tow nsend ( 1965)] .   Si nce t hese all ow ances r epresent  t he l evel  of  i ncom e t hat   society,  via.   t he 
governm ent ,  i s prepared to provi de t hey are perhaps t he cl osest  approxi ma t i on t o a sociall y
approved defi ni t i on of  povert y.   Ho we v e r ,   schem es such as i ncom e support   are generall y i ncreased 
i n l i ne w i t h i nfl ati on r ather  t han assessed f or  t hei r   abil i t y t o m eet  expendi t ure needs.  The  sett i ng of 
benefi t   r ates i s not   ma d e   purely on basi c hum an r equir em ents,  wi t h i ssues such as wo r k i ncenti ves,  
pol i t i cal  cli ma t e and  norma t i ve  j udgem ent s   of  r elati ve  me r i t   als o  aff ecti ng  t he  decision.  
Per haps t he l east cont enti ous w ay forwa r d i s to adopt  a relati ve m easure w hereby t he 
povert y t hreshol d i s defi ned as a cert ain percentage of me d i an or m ean househol d i ncom e
[ Bl ackburn (1993),  Buhm an et al  ( 1988),  For ster ( 1994),  O’ Hi ggi ns and Jenki ns (1990)] .
Mo r eover,  to cont r ol  for the m ul t i -dime n s i onal i t y of we l f are and the het erogenei t y of indi vi dual s ,  
i ncom e i s generall y ‘ equi val i sed’  t o cont r ol   f or  characteri sti cs t hat   proxy t he exigency of  dem and -
f or  exam ple f am il y s i ze,  com posi t i on,  locati on and healt h.   The  equi val i s ed i ncom e f or  an i ndi vi dual   i









wh e r eXi  denot es i ndi vi duali ’ s househol d i ncom e,   Cii ndi vi duali’ s househol d  characteri sti cs,  and  E
t he equi val ence scale as a f unct i on of i’ s househol d characteri sti cs. 5  I n wh a t   f ol l ow s we   adopt   t he 
equi val ence scali ng me t hod used by t he OECD  ( 1982)  wh i ch equi val i ses f or  househol d  expendi t ure 
needs usi ng  t he  we i ght i ng  system  f or  househol d  com posi t i on  set  out   i n  Tabl e I   bel ow .
Tabl e I :   Equi valence Scal e De t ai l s
H ousehol d  Me mb e r We i ght
Si ngl e  adul t1 . 00
Second  and  subsequent   adul t s0 . 70
Each  chil d0 . 50
Not e:  A  chil d  i s classif i ed as  som eone  under  14
Source:  OECD  (1982)
5  I t   i s apparent  t hat   t hat   em pir i cal  r esult s are  cri t i call y  dependent   on  t he  equi val ence  scale  chosen.   The  adopt i on 
of  an i nadequat e  scale  ma y   we l l   mi srepresent  t he  t r ue  overl ap  bet w een  l ow   pay  and  povert y.   Thecom posi t i on  of 
t hose  defi ned  as  poor  could  also be  aff ected.  Thi s i s support ed  by  Wh i t eford’s ( 1985)  com pari son of  t he  me t hod 
i n wh i ch equi val ence scales adjust   t he i ncom e of  a singl e person,   a coupl e and  a coupl e wi t h  t wo   chil dren are 
t r eated.  A ssum ing  t hat   a  coupl e’s i ncom e  i s not   adjust ed,  a  singl e  person’s calculated  equi val i sed i ncom e  vari es 
bet w een 49%   and  94%   of  hi s/her  actual   i ncom e.   For   a coupl e wi t h  t wo   chil dren,  t he  equi val i sed i ncom e  r anges 
f r om   111%   t o  193%   of  t hei r   actual   i ncom e.  8 8
A dopt i ng  t he  above  we i ght s t he  equi val ence scale can be  expressed expl i cit l y  as:
( ) 10 . 70 . 5 ii i EC A D =+ + ( 2)
wh e r e i A  denot es the num ber of ot her adul t s and  i D t he num ber of chil dren in i ndi vi dual  i ’ s
househol d.  Us i ng t hi s scale, a househol d w i t h t w o adul t s and t hree chil dren is equi val ent to 3. 2 
adul t s.  We   also f ol l ow   t he  OECD  ( 1982)  i n  defi ni ng  ma l e wo r ki ng  povert y  as equi val i sed househol d 
i ncom e  bel ow   t wo- t hi r ds  of  t he  me d i an overall   equi val i sed househol d  i ncom e  f or  any  part i cular  year.  
Si mi l arl y,  we  d e f i ne ‘l ow  pay’ as a w age below  t wo- t hi r ds of the m edi an overall  wa g e  f or each 
specif i c year.
S u mma r y stati sti cs,  based on ( 1)  and ( 2)  above are set  out   i n Tabl e I I .   I t   i s apparent  t hat  
t here has been a substanti al increase in w orki ng povert y and i n t he proport i on of the l ow  pai d 
t herein across t he t wo   t i me   f r am es. 6  Report ed underem ploym ent ,   how ever,   has r em ained r elati vel y 
const ant.
Tabl e I I :   Poverty,  Low  Pay,   and  U nderem pl oym ent  
Sam pl e:  Ma l e  Empl oyees
Per i od  On e   %P e r i od  Two  %
Povert y6 . 01 1 . 3
Low  Pay 9. 91 3 . 9
U nderem ploym ent 3. 94 . 2
%  of   t hose  i n  Poverty who  are:
                                                                        Low  Pai d 30. 6 42. 1
                      U nderem pl oyed 10.0 11. 9
Not e:  Per i od  On e   -   1985,   1987,   1990;  Per i od  Two  -   1993,   1994,   1996
A  com m on w eakness w i t h al l  povert y l i ne approaches is thei r  ‘l um pi ness’ i n ascri bi ng povert y
aff l i cti on.   As   Wa t t s ( 1968)  poi nt s out :
‘ Povert y  i s not   r eall y  a di screte condi t i on.   On e   does  not   i mme d i ately  acqui r e or  shed 
t he aff l i cti ons w e associ ate w it h t he not i on of povert y by crossing any part i cular 
i ncom e  l i ne’  [ Wa t t s ( 1968),   p. 325]
Al t ernat i ve m easures of povert y t ake int o account  the ‘povert y gap’ -  the ext ent by w hi ch an 
i ndi vi dual ’ s i ncom e f all s short   of  t he povert y t hreshol d - and t herefore off er  som e cont r ol   over  t he 
i nt ensit y of  povert y.   The  Fost er  I ndex  [ Fost er  et  al   ( 1984)] ,   f or  exam ple,  i s defi ned  as:



















z %  denot es the i m put ed povert y l i ne (e.g.  t wo- t hi r ds of me d i an overall  equi val i sed incom e),
ii gz y =− % , i yz ∀< % ,   t he ‘ povert y gap’  f or  ‘ poor’   r espondent   i ,   and  i y  t he  net   equi val i sed i ncom e 
f or ‘poor’  respondenti .N  denot es t he t ot al  popul ati on,  I the num ber of ‘poor’  househol ds (i . e. 
t hose w i t h equi val i sed incom e bel ow  t he i m put ed povert y l i ne  z % ) ,   and a   t he we l f are j udgem ent  
att ached t o t he m agni t ude of  i g. B y   s ubst i t ut i ng s pecif i c val ues  f or  a,   t he  f ol l ow i ng  special  cases of 






















= ∑   denot es t he average povert y gap of  t hose i n povert y.   Equat i on ( 4)  i s simp l y a 
m easure of  povert y  usi ng  t he  t hreshol d  procedure wh i l st  equat i on  ( 5)  defi nes  t he  average short f all   as 
a proport i on of  t he povert y l i ne mu l t i pl i ed by t he headcount   r ati o.   For   cases wh e n   2 a >   t he  i ndex 
also consi ders di str i but i onal   aspects,  wi t h mo r e we i ght   bei ng att ached t o t he l argest   r elati ve povert y 
gaps.   As   a →∞,   t he  i ndex  approaches t he  ‘ Ra wl sian’  povert y  m easure wh e r e onl y  t he  posi t i on  of 
t he poorest househol d i s consi dered. The Fos t er Index t herefore encom passes povert y m easures 
t hat   att ach we l f are j udgem ent s t o  t he  m agni t ude  of  povert y  gaps. 7
A not her advant age of t he Fost er I ndex i s that  i t  i s addi t i vel y decom posabl e w it h t he
aggregate povert y m easured as t he we i ght ed average of  subgroup povert y.   For   exam ple,  assum ing 
t he  popul ati on  can be  di vi ded  i nt o  J subgroups,   t he  Fost er  i ndex  can be  expressed as:
7  Sen  ( 1976,   1979)  proposes  t hat   any  povert y  m easure shoul d  sati sfy  t he  f ol l ow i ng  axiom s.   The  povert y  m easure 
mu s t   i ncrease as t he  i ncom e  of  t he  poorest  househol d  i s r educed ( t he  m onot oni cit y  axiom ).   An   i ncom e  t r ansfer 
from  a poor  househol d  t o  any  ot her  househol d  t hat   i s richer shoul d  i ncrease t he  povert y  m easure (the  t ransfer
axiom ).  K undu and Sm i t h (1983),  how ever,  quest i on t he desi r abil i t y of the t r ansfer axiom .  The Fos t er index 
sati sfi es the m onot oni cit y axi om  w hen  0 > a   ( i . e.  wh e n   t hi s i s sati sfi ed, gi   i ncreases as yi   f all s).   The  t r ansfer 
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wh e r e j K   denot es t he num ber  of  poor  househol ds i n sub-group j  and nj  t he  num ber  of  i ndi vi dual s  
i n  subgroup  j .   The  percentage of  a sub-group  t hat   are consi dered poor,   Lj,   i s t hen  calculated as:
( )100% jj LP a = ( 8)
De f i ni ng underem ployed and l ow-pai d w orkers as sub-groups,   t he cont r i but i on of  eit her  t o t ot al 












Tabl e I I I   sets out   s u mma r y  stati sti cs based  on  ( 9)  above  wi t h a  set  t o  1  and  2  f or  com pari son:11 11
Tabl e I I I :   Wo r k i ng  Poverty,  U nderem pl oym ent   and  Low  Pay
Sam pl e:  Ma l e  Empl oyees
Average  Poverty 
G ap  (£)
Cont ribut i on  of   t he  Low 
Pai d  t o  Poverty  (% )
Cont ribut i on  of   t he 
U nderem pl oyed  t o  Poverty  (% )
a=1 a=2 a=1 a=2
Per i od  O ne 1203 51. 06 1 . 31 1 . 81 3 . 9
Per i od  Tw o 3136 51. 95 1 . 11 5 . 61 5 . 8
I t   i s apparent  t hat   t he average povert y gap has i ncreased ma r kedl y i n r eal  t erms   over  t he t wo   t i me  
peri ods.  Al t hough ‘l ow-pai d’ r espondent s represent t he m aj ori t y of t he w orki ng poor,  t hei r
cont r i but i on t o overall   povert y has i ncreased ma r gi nal l y ( by 1. 8 per  cent)   i n t he a =  1 case,  wh i l st 
actual l y f all i ng ( by 16. 6 per  cent)   wh e n   a =  2.   I n cont r ast,   t he cont r i but i on of  t he underem ployed 
has i ncreased unequi vocall y over  t he t wo   t i me   peri ods,   by 32. 2 per  cent  wh e n   a =  1  and  by  13. 7 
per  cent  wh e n   a =  2.
IV . T he Ext ent  of  U nderem ploym ent  and  U nderpaym ent 
W e now  i nvest i gat e the relati ve cont r i but i ons of underem ploym ent  and underpaym ent  to w orki ng 
povert y i n Bri t ain.  U nderem ploym ent  is analysed by est i ma t i ng a desi r ed hours of wo r k equat i on 
wh i l s t  underpaym ent  is expl ored by analysi ng a w age equat i on est i ma t ed by st ochast i c fr ont i er 
t echni ques.
U nderem pl oym ent
The suppl y of l abour of a representati ve i ndi vi dual i  i s  generall y m easured by m odel l i ng t he 
r elati onshi p  bet w een act ual   hours wo r ked,   hi,   and  a vector  of  expl anatory  vari ables:
ii i h e =+ AX ( 10)
wh e r e ( )
2 , 0 e d e N i→  i s an i. i . d.  r andom  err or t erm.  Ou r  f ocus,  how ever,  i s to m easure
unconst rained (or desi red)  hours, 
*
i h .   Ou r   presum pt i on i s t hat   i ndi vi dual s h ave a mi ni mu m  hours  
r equi r em ent, i m ,v i s. the m i ni m um  num ber of hours necessary t o m eet thei r  expendi t ure needs. 
H ence,  we   onl y  observe  desi r ed hours i f   actual   hours are greater  t han  or  equal   t o  t he  mi ni mu m  hours 







ho t herwi se
⎧ ≥ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
( 11)
Gi ven t hat   we   do not   observe 
*
i h   f or  i ndi vi dual s declari ng t hem sel ves t o be underem ployed,   OLS 
est i ma t i on  usi ng  i h  i s i nappropri ate since t he t r uncated nat ure of  t he dependent   vari able w oul d  l ead 
t o  bi ased r esult s.  Sam pl e selecti on  t echni ques  are,  t herefore,  appropri ate. 
Al t hough we   do not   observe  i m ,   f ol l ow i ng Br een ( 1996),   we   assum e t hey ma y   be wr i t t en 
as:
ii i m h =+ BZ ( 12)
wh e r e i Z  denot es a vector of observed vari ables w hich capture labour suppl y preferences and 
()
2 , 0 h d h N i →   i s an i . i . d.   r andom   err or.   The  probabi l i t y  of  observi ng  non-const r ained  hours i s t hus:  
( ) ( )
* Pr Pr ii i ii hh h h ≥= − ≥ BZ ( 13)
We   t herefore have  an endogenous  selecti on  probl em ,  wi t h  t he  observat i on  of  non-const r ained  hours 
and  underem ploym ent   r eport i ng  det ermi ned  simu l t aneously.
To  corr ect  f or  t he censored sam ple,  ma x i mu m  l i kel i hood esti ma t i on i s used t o m odel   non-
const r ained hours. The l i kel i hood funct i on for t hi s m odel  has t wo  p a r t s. Those report i ng
underem ploym ent   cont r i but e a t erm  r elated t o t he probabi l i t y t hat   t he mi ni mu m  hours r equi r em ent 
exceeds actual   hours:
( ) ( ) ( ) Pr Pr Pr ii i i i i i i i i hm eh h e < = +< + = −> − AX BZ AX BZ ( 14)
The  t erm  ii he −   i s   norma l l y  di s t r i but ed wi t h  vari ance:
222 2 he e h sss s =+− ( 15)









wh e r e ( ) . Φ   denot es t he uni vari ate standerd norma l   condi t onal   densi t y f unct i on.   Fol l ow i ng  M addal a 
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∑ AX ( 17)
wh e r e i t   i s assum ed t hat   K  i ndi vi dual s   out   of  a popul ati on  of  s i ze N  r eport   t hem sel ves  as bei ng  eit her 




22 2 2 ii ii hh
eh e




Θ= − − − ⎢⎥
− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
BZ AX ( 18)
The  com plete l og-l i kel i hood f or  t he m odel   i s t hen t he sum  of  ( 16)  f or  t hose cont ent  wi t h  t hei r   hours  
or  overem ployed,   and  ( 17)  f or  t hose  r eport i ng  underem ploym ent .
Tabl e I V:   Es t i ma t ed De s i red H ours Equat i ons
Per i od  On e Pe r i od  Two
O LS C orrected O LS C orrected
Var i abl eC o e f .T - St at Coef .T - St at Coef .T - St at Coef .T - St at
Const ant 38. 461 16. 298 43. 483 16. 890 36. 375 14. 662 39. 670 15. 099
Log  Ne t   W age - 5. 687 -11. 891 -5. 730 -13. 571 -4. 743 -11. 503 -5. 249 -14. 709
Non  Labour  I ncom e - 1. 850 -7. 098 -1. 748 -8. 201 -1. 507 -6. 935 -1. 547 -10. 898
Age 0. 921 6. 980 0. 725 5. 321 0. 803 6. 003 0. 737 5. 386
Age  Squared - 0. 012 -7. 221 -0. 010 -5. 869 -0. 010 -6. 095 -0. 009 -5. 643
M arried 2. 112 3. 653 2. 183 3. 962 1. 409 3. 023 1. 344 2. 824
Un i on - 2. 426 -5. 691 -2. 017 -4. 457 -0. 796 -1. 926 -0. 480 -1. 054
s -- 8 . 729 75. 937 - - 8. 722 100. 51
eh e h rss s = -- - 0. 773 -11. 646 - - -0. 570 -5. 785
R- Squared 0. 123 0. 088
St andard  D eviat i on 8. 672 8. 701
Not e: The net wage m easure i s adj ust ed for m argi nal  rates of incom e t axes and personal  al l owances whi l st non l abour 
i ncom e  i s proxi ed by  subt racti ng  t he  respondent ’s earnings  f rom  househol d  i ncom e.
Tabl e I V  presents t he r esult s obt ained by em ployi ng t he esti ma t i on procedure out l i ned above.   The 
underl yi ng sam pl e selecti on probi t  analysi s is set out  in t he A ppendi x.  Two s et s of esti ma t es are 
presented f or  com pari son purposes f or  each t i me   peri od – OLS  esti ma t es and esti ma t es corr ected 
f or  sam ple selecti on  bi as.
The  r esult s across t he  t wo   t i me   peri ods  are r easonabl y  r obust   wi t h  t he  esti ma t ed coeff i cients 
f or peri od one bei ng generall y som ew hat  l arger i n m agni t ude.  The r esult s support  an inverse 
r elati onshi p bet w een desi r ed hours and bot h net   wa g e s   and non l abour  i ncom e and as such w oul d 14 14
suggest   t he presence of  a dom i nant   i ncom e eff ect.   Ther e i s a concave r elati onshi p bet w een age and 
desi r ed hours whi l st  bei ng ma r r i ed ( me mb e r   of  a t r ade uni on)  exert s a posi t i ve ( negat i ve)  i nfl uence 
on  desi r ed hours.
U nderpaym ent
Labour  ma r ket s are t ypi call y characteri sed by i mp e r f ect  i nforma t i on as r egards bot h t he avail abil i t y 
of  j ob opport uni t i es and t he t i me   needed t o successful l y f orm  an em ployer-em ployee ma t ch.  Such 
f r i cti ons w oul d suggest   t hat   wo r kers adopt   r eservat i on wa g e   str ategies,  wh e r eby onl y wa g e   off ers 
exceeding t he r eservat i on wa g e   are accepted [ see,  f or  exam ple,  Mo r t ensen ( 1986)  and Li ppm an 
and Mc C a l l  ( 1976)] .  The r eservat i on w age i s determi ned by equat i ng t he m argi nal  benefi t s and 
ma r gi nal   costs associated wi t h  f urt her  i ncrem ents t o  t he  r eservat i on  wa g e .   The  pot enti al  r ew ard  f or  a 
hi gher r eservat i on w age i s increased li f eti m e earni ngs once em pl oym ent  i s secured. A h i gher 
r eservat i on w age,  how ever,  com pels the searcher to hi gher foregone earni ngs and search costs 
associated w it h t he hi gher expected durati on of unem pl oym ent .  On e  i mp l i cati on of thi s dynam i c 
m onopsony si t uat i on i s that  em ployees w il l  be pai d a w age bel ow  t he m axi mu m ( vis.  pot enti al)  
wa g e ,ˆ w ,   i mp l i ed by  t hei r   hum an  capit al  att r i but es. 
Al t hough t hese  ˆ w  are unobserved,  w e m ay deri ve an esti ma t e of t hem via stochast i c 
f r ont i er techni ques.  He d o n i c wa g e   equat i ons,   r elati ng earni ngs t o hum an capit al  characteri sti cs,  are 
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=∑ , 1, 2, . . . , in = , i j x   i s t he value  of  hum an  capit al  characteri sti c  j   f or  i ndi vi dual   i ,
i w   i s   t he wa g e   of  i ndi vi dual  iand ()
2 , 0 m d m N i →   i s an i . i . d.   r andom  err or  t erm.   Es t i ma t i on of  t hi s 
stochast i c r elati onshi p yi elds an esti ma t e of  t he expected val ue of  t he dependent   vari able,  i w ,   f or  a 
gi ven l evel of the i ndependent  vari able i x.  The s t ochast i c fr ont i er techni que,  how ever,  provi des a 
me t hod of obt aini ng t he m axi mu m r ather than m ean val ue of the dependent   val ue f or  i ndi vi dual  i.
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()
2 , 0 c d c N i→   i s an i . i . d.   r andom  err or  t erm  and 0 i f ≤   i s   a one-si ded err or  t erm  wi t h vari ance, 
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wh e r e the t wo- s i ded err or t erm, i c ,  r efl ects an indi vi dual ’ s unobserved characteri sti cs. For
i nst ance, i c  wi l l  be negat i ve for wo r kers w ho pl ace a relati vel y hi gh val ue on non-pecuni ary j ob 
characteri sti cs such as good  wo r k  condi t i ons.
The degree of underpaym ent  i s captured by t he one-si ded err or term,   i f ,  so that   t he 
i ndi vi dual   r eceives  hi s   pot enti al  wa g e   i f   i f   equal s zero.   For   wo r kers t hat   t ermi nat e j ob  search before 
t hey  are off ered t hei r   pot enti al  wa g e ,   t he  wa g e   f r ont i er  can be  expressed as:
() ( ) exp exp exp
J
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As s um i ng i f   i s exponent i all y  di str i but ed,  t he  expected r ati o  of  actual   wa g e   t o  pot enti al  wa g e   f or  any 
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( 23)
wh e r e f m   r epresents t he  sam ple m ean of  f.
D ynam i c m onopsony t heory assum es that  fi r m s post  w age off ers and w orkers react by 
f r eely m ovi ng am ong em ployers   i n r esponse t o t he perm anent   wa g e   off er  di f f erenti als .   I t   i s   unl i kel y 
t hat  the w age characteri sti cs of uni oni sed sectors, wh e r e w ages are determi ned by a bargai ni ng 
process, wi l l  mi mi c the non-uni oni sed search f r am ew ork.   Fur t her,   uni ons ma y   be able t o di r ectl y 
provi de i nforma t i on r egardi ng t he r eservat i on wa g e s   of  t hei r   me mb e r s.  Thi s i nforma t i on can alt er  t he
equi l i bri um  wa g e   condi t i ons t hat   r esult   f r om  search t heory.   The  analysi s i s t herefore conduct ed f or 
bot h a non-uni o n  me mb e r  sam ple and a sam ple of all  wo r kers for purposes of com pari son.  The 
r esult s f r om   t he  stochast i c f r ont i er  analysi s are presented i n  Tabl e V  bel ow .
Tabl e V:   St ochast i c Front i er Anal ysis of   U nderpaym ent
Per i od  On e Pe r i od  Two16 16
Non-U ni on  W orkers All   W orkers N on-U nion  W orkers All   W orkers
Var i abl e Coe f fT - R a t i oC o e f fT - R a t i oC o e f fT - R a t i oC o e f fT - R a t i o
Const ant -0. 008 -0. 060 0. 224 2. 436 0. 145 0. 848 0. 411 3. 245
Years of   Educat i on 0. 069 10. 046 0. 061 12. 361 0. 071 8. 365 0. 063 9. 990
Exper i ence 0.029 7. 500 0. 027 9. 786 0. 029 6. 668 0. 033 9. 864
Exper i ence Squared -4. 4E- 4 - 5. 740 -4. 3  E- 4 - 7. 888 -4. 3  E- 4 - 5. 216 -5. 4  E- 4 - 8. 224
Spouse 0. 185 5. 091 0. 184 7. 748 0. 098 3. 432 0. 077 3. 392
Chi l dren 0. 005 0. 343 0. 005 0. 537 0. 000 0. 025 0. 000 -0. 006
As i an -0. 177 -1. 654 -0. 261 -4. 193 -0. 266 -3. 434 -0. 242 -3. 885
Af ro-Car i bbean -0. 109 -1. 388 -0. 119 -2. 127 -0. 182 -1. 591 -0. 234 -2. 774
Ot her -0. 022 -0. 138 -0. 016 -0. 142 -0. 129 -1. 348 -0. 098 -1. 130
Pr of essional 0. 427 9. 659 0. 378 12. 253 0. 518 12. 426 0. 532 16. 513
Cl erical 0.285 5. 482 0. 224 6. 175 0. 210 4. 307 0. 202 5. 030
Ski l l ed M anual 0. 168 3. 880 0. 147 5. 032 0. 184 4. 237 0. 215 6. 836
Sem i - Ski l l   M anual 0. 040 0. 718 0. 000 -0. 013 0. 035 0. 709 0. 035 0. 987
Scot l and -0. 111 -2. 138 -0. 104 -2. 906 -0. 093 -1. 607 -0. 116 -2. 745
Nor t h  Eas t - 0. 162 -2. 611 -0. 112 -2. 876 -0. 083 -1. 247 -0. 118 -2. 394
Nor t h  We s t - 0. 258 -3. 990 -0. 194 -5. 655 -0. 170 -3. 032 -0. 137 -3. 275
Yorks/Hu mb e r s i de -0. 217 -3. 448 -0. 175 -4. 729 -0. 152 -2. 688 -0. 154 -3. 603
We s t   Mi dl ands -0. 192 -3. 939 -0. 202 -6. 101 -0. 139 -2. 555 -0. 124 -2. 899
Eas t   Mi dl ands -0. 170 -2. 611 -0. 188 -4. 920 -0. 114 -1. 951 -0. 078 -1. 819
Eas t   Angl i a- 0. 125 -2. 063 -0. 179 -4. 026 -0. 095 -1. 316 -0. 032 -0. 576
Sout h  We s t - 0. 251 -4. 703 -0. 226 -6. 343 -0. 078 -1. 482 -0. 096 -2. 226
Sout h  Eas t - 0. 086 -2. 030 -0. 089 -3. 102 0. 023 0. 526 0. 016 0. 445
Wa l es -0. 224 -3. 410 -0. 230 -5. 309 -0. 231 -2. 872 -0. 208 -3. 422
1989 0. 171 5. 442 0. 135 6. 597 - - - -
1990 0. 230 7. 139 0. 166 7. 749 - - - -
1994 - - - - 0. 015 0. 435 0. 010 0. 399
1996 - - - - 0. 168 5. 266 0. 138 5. 703
Un i on  Me mb e r - - 0 . 064 3. 698 - - 0. 126 6. 049
Rat i o
1 84. 20 85. 28 78. 76 80. 86
N 882 1710 1072 1871
Not e:  1.   Average percentage  of   act ual   t o  pot enti al   wage.
I n general,   our  r esult s accord wi t h a pri ori   expectati ons – hence we   wi l l   onl y c o mme n t   on t hem  
bri efl y.  Ac r oss bot h t i me  p e r i ods and across bot h set s of specif i cati ons,  educati on i s posi t i vel y 
associated w it h w ages.  Labour ma r ket  experi ence im pacts concavely on w ages.  In addi t i on,  
occupat i onal   status appears t o be a key det ermi nant   of  wa g e s .   Fi nal l y,   t here are onl y very ma r gi nal  
di f f erences bet w een t he  esti ma t es calculated f or  t he  ‘ all   wo r ker’   and  ‘ non-uni on  wo r ker’   sam ples.
IV . U nderem ploym ent,U nderpaym ent  and  Wo r k i ng  Poverty
We   now  use t he r egression esti ma t es obt ained i n Secti on I I I   t o simu l ate t he eff ects of  eli mi nat i ng 
underpaym ent   and  underem ploym ent   on  wo r ki ng  povert y  i n  Br i t ain.  17 17
Tabl e VI   bel ow  sets out   actual   and simu l ated povert y r ates for  peri ods one and t wo .   The 
actual  povert y rates are those report ed in Secti on II  (i . e. wi t h povert y defi ned as ‘equi val i sed’ 
i ncom e bel ow  t wo- t hi r ds of  me d i an overall   equi val i sed i ncom e).   The  simu l ated r ates are calculated 
usi ng t he actual  incom e di s t r i but i on f or  scenari os under  wh i ch r espondent s are pai d t hei r   capacit y 
wa g e   or  are f r ee t o  wo r k  t hei r   desi r ed num ber  of  hours.8
Tabl e VI :   Act ual   and  Pr edi cted Wo r k i ng  Poverty Rat es
Per i od  On e Pe r i od  Two
Wo r k i ng  Poverty  Rat e  ( W PR) 6. 0 11. 3
W PR  wi t h  U nderpaym ent   El i mi nat i on  (
s
ii w w = ) 4. 3    8. 5
W PR  wi t h  U nderem pl oym ent   El i mi nat i on  (
*
ii hh = ) 5. 4 10. 4
The  r esult s suggest   t hat   eli mi nat i ng underpaym ent   has a mo r e subst anti al  i m pact  on t he r educt i on of 
esti ma t ed w orki ng povert y.  El i mi nat i ng underpaym ent  ( underem ploym ent )  r educes the average
povert y gap i n peri ods one and t w o by 28. 3 (10. 0) and 24. 8 (8. 0) per cent respecti vel y.  These 
di f f erences are perhaps not   alt oget her  surpri sing - t he r elati vel y l ow  i nci dence of  underem ploym ent
m eans  t hat   f ew  peopl e wi l l   benefi t   f r om   i t s   eli mi nat i on.
Tabl e VI I   extends our  analysi s t o i nvest i gat e t he eff ects of  eli mi nat i ng underem ploym ent   and 
underpaym ent   on t he povert y gap,   and on t he cont r i but i ons t o t he wo r ki ng povert y r ate ( WP R )   of 
t hose  r espondent s i ni t i all y  deem ed t o  be  ‘ l ow   pai d’  or  ‘ underem ployed’.
Tabl e VI I :   The  Poverty Ga p
Per i od  On e Pe r i od  Two
1 a = 2 a = 1 a = 2 a =
Raw  Da t a
1
Average  Poverty  G ap  (£) 1203 3136
Cont ribut i on  of   ‘ l ow  pai d’  t o  W PR  ( %)
2 51. 0 61. 3 51. 9 51. 1
Cont ribut i on  of   ‘ underem pl oyed’  t o  W PR  ( %)
2 11. 8 13. 9 15. 6 15. 8
El i mi nat i on  of   U nderpaym ent   (
s
ii w w = )
Average  Poverty  G ap  (£) 1084 3159
8  De s i r ed hours are deri ved  f r om   t he  r egression  r esult s,  corr ected f or  sam ple selecti on  bi as,  set  out   i n  Tabl e I V.  
The  pot enti al  wa g e   i s based  on  t he  ‘ all   wo r ker’   stochast i c f r ont i er  esti ma t es set  out   i n  Tabl e V.   We   assum e t hat
wo r kers suppl y t he sam e num ber of hours (r eceive t he sam e w age) wh e n  t hey are paid t hei r  pot enti al wa g e  
( all ow ed  t o  wo r k  t hei r   desi r ed hours).   Mo r eover,   no  r eference has  been ma d e   t o  ot her  earners i n  t he  househol d.  
For   exam ple,  i f   wo r ki ng  spouses  are  al so underpai d,   corr ecti on  f or  t hi s i s l i kel y  t o  f urt her  r educe  t he  povert y  r ate.18 18
Cont ribut i on  of   ‘ l ow  pai d’  t o  W PR  ( % ) 61. 6 68. 9 58. 5 55. 3
El i mi nat i on  of   U nderem pl oym ent   (
*
ii hh = )
Average  Poverty  G ap  (£) 1171 3238
Cont ribut i on  of   ‘ underem pl oyed’  t o  W PR  ( %) 4 . 14 . 2 10. 1 14. 2
Not es:
1.   Raw  Da t a  t aken f rom  Tabl e I I I .
2.   ‘ Low  pai d’  ( ‘ underem pl oyed’)   w orkers are  t hose  respondent s ori gi nal l y desi gnat ed as  such i n  Secti on  I I .
The  r esult s are now  som ew hat  mo r e esoteri c.  The  eli mi nat i on of  underpaym ent   ( underem ploym ent )  
r educes t he average povert y gap i n peri od one by 9. 9 ( 2. 7)  per  cent.   I n peri od t wo ,   how ever,   t he 
eli mi nat i on of bot h underpaym ent  and underem ploym ent  raise the gap - by 0. 7 and 3. 3 per  cent 
r especti vel y.
I n t erms   of  t he r elati ve cont r i but i ons t o wo r ki ng povert y t he r esult s are even l ess clear.   The 
eli mi nat i on of  underem ploym ent   r educes t he cont r i but i on of  t hose r espondent s ori gi nal l y deem ed t o 
be underem ployed i n bot h peri ods,  acutely so i n peri od one - by 65. 3 ( 1 a = )   and 69. 8 percent 
( 2 a = )   i n  peri od  one,   and  by  35. 3  ( 1 a = )   and  10. 1  per  cent  ( 2 a = )   i n  peri od  t wo .
I n cont r ast,  t he el i mi nat i on of underpaym ent  actual l y raises the cont r i but i on of t hose
r espondent s ori gi nal l y deem ed t o be ‘ l ow  pai d’  i n bot h peri ods - i n peri od  one  by  20. 8  ( 1 a = )   and 
9. 9 percent ( 2 a = ) ,  and i n peri od t w o by 12. 7 ( 1 a = )   and 8. 2 percent  ( 2 a = ) .   The  non ‘ l ow  
pai d’ wo r ki ng poor wi l l  also benefi t  fr om  t he eli mi nat i on of  underpaym ent ,   and i t   i s   qui t e poss i bl e 
t hat  thei r  cont r i but i on t o w orki ng povert y w i l l  be reduced by m ore than t hat  of thei r  ‘l ow  pai d’ 
count erpart s.  I ndeed,  ‘ l ow  pai d’  wo r kers wi l l   i ncl ude i ndi vi dual s wi t h severe povert y gaps,   and t he 
eli mi nat i on  of  underpaym ent   ma y   be  i nsuff i cient  f or  m any  of  t hese  t o  escape povert y.  
Such f i ndi ngs raise concern as t o t he eff ecti veness of t he m i ni m um  w age as a povert y
all eviati on devi ce. Pr oponent s of t he m i ni mu m wa g e  a r gue t hat  l abour ma r ket  f r i cti ons and
underpaym ent  are suff i cientl y endem i c to i m m uni s e the econom y fr om  any undue di s em ploym ent  
eff ects t hat   mi ght   r esult   f r om   t he  i nst i gat i on  of  such a wa g e .   Ou r   r esult s suggest   t hat   underpaym ent   i s 
perhaps not   as wi despread or  as deep r oot ed as previousl y envisaged  and  cast  som e doubt   on  t he 
abil i t y  of  t he  mi ni mu m  wa g e   t o  all eviate povert y.  
V. Fi nal   Co mme n t s
I n t hi s paper  we   have expl ored t he i mp l i cati ons of  l abour  dem and const r aint s on t he propensi t y t o 
experi ence povert y.  Si nce these const r aint s can m anif est  them sel ves i n t erms  o f  bot h pri ces and19 19
quant i t i es, w e have focused part i cularl y on t he relati ve cont r i but i ons of underem ploym ent  and 
underpaym ent .
Ou r   analysi s suggest s t hat   t here has been a signi f i cant  i ncrease i n wo r ki ng povert y i n Br i t ain 
over t he peri od 1985-1996,  t he m aj ori t y of wh i ch can be att r i but ed to underpaym ent .
U nderem ploym ent ,  how ever,  is seen to represent a signi f i cant,  and i ncreasing,  const r aint  on t he 
abil i t y  of  em ployees t o  escape povert y.  
I n t erms  of pol i cy, the hypot het i cal eli mi nat i on of  underpaym ent   and /   or  underpaym ent   i s 
seen t o  r educe t he wo r ki ng povert y r ate over  t hi s peri od.   Thei r   eli mi nat i on also r educes t he average 
povert y gap i n t he earl y part   of  t hi s peri od ( 1985,   1987,   1990)  wh i l st  i ncreasing i t   i n t he l att er  part  
( 1993,  1994,  1996).  In t erms  o f  the eff ects on t hose respondent s w it hi n our sam ple ori gi nal l y
deem ed to be ‘l ow  pai d’ or ‘ underem ployed’,  i t  i s seen that  perhaps t he el i mi nat i on of
underem ploym ent  i s preferable. Par t i cularl y i n t he earl y part  of our study,  all owi ng t hose
r espondent s deem ed to be suppl y const r ained t o w ork t hei r  preferr ed hours (wh i l st earni ng t he 
sam e w age rate) reduces thei r  cont r i but i on t o t he w orki ng povert y rate by approxi ma t ely 67 per 
cent.  In cont r ast,  all ow i ng t hose respondent s deem ed to be ‘ l ow  pai d’  t o earn t hei r   pot enti al  ( i . e. 
stochast i c fr ont i er)  wa g e  ( wh i l st suppl yi ng t he sam e num ber of hours) actual l y raises thei r
cont r i but i on t he w orki ng povert y rate. Such f i ndi ngs m ay i mp l y t hat  the ext ent of underpaym ent  
wi t hi n t h e  UK l abour ma r ket  is not  as w idespread as previousl y envi saged,  and m ay cast  som e 
doubt   on  t he  abil i t y  of  t he  mi ni mu m  wa g e   t o  all eviate povert y.20 20
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Appendi x
Tabl e AI
Probi t   Res ul t s
D ependent   Var i abl e  =  Wo r k   De s i red H ours
Per i od  On e Pe r i od  Two
Var i abl eC o e f f i cient T  stat i sti cC o e f f i cient T  stat i sti c
Const ant - 1. 363 -3. 176 -0. 956 -2. 572
Non- wor k i ng  spouse - 0. 324 -1. 747 -0. 317 -1. 817
Wo r k i ng  spouse 0. 052 0. 293 0. 016 0. 094
Age 0. 018 2. 988 0. 021 3. 683
W age  perceived  t o  be  l ow - 0. 280 -2. 196 -0. 404 -3. 381
Expected  i ncom e  growt h0 . 007 0. 054 -0. 082 -0. 621
Expected  f i rm  size reduct i on - 0. 034 -0. 225 -0. 092 -0. 690
Di vorced 0. 172 0. 383 -0. 395 -2. 112
Un i on  me mb e r 0 . 151 1. 123 0. 03 0. 300
Pr of essional 0. 791 4. 204 0. 625 3. 903
Cl erical 0. 369 1. 662 0. 336 1. 649
Ski l l ed  M anuf act uri ng 0. 051 0. 338 0. 080 0. 538
H ours 0. 057 6. 284 0. 051 6. 688
Log- Li kli hood - 232. 690 -265. 389
Res t ricted  Log- Li keli hood - 282. 720 -327. 326
Chi   Squared  St at i sti c 100. 604 123. 873
Pseudo  R- Squared 0. 392 0. 383
Numbe r   of   O bservati ons 1710 1871